labrys, études féministes/ estudos feministas
janeiro/ junho 2016 - janvier/juillet 2016

Changes and challenges: Norwegian feminisms

Beatrice Halsaa,

Abstract:
This article has two main parts: It sets off by discussing Norwegian political opportunity structures in relation to feminist and women’s rights activism in a historical perspective. Despite a widespread faith in Nordic gender equality, and an impressive Nordic reputation of women-friendly policies, there are numerous challenges for feminist mobilisation in contemporary Norway. The present right-wing coalition government has annoyed important parts of the women’s movement, and also revitalised ‘Conservative feminism’ [Høyrefeminisme] and the notion of ‘blue stockings’ (Brodtkorb 2012; Thue and Wæthing 2014). The second part of the article is a discussion of state feminism in Norway, emphasising the opportunity structures of majority and ethnic minority women’s movements. The main claim, underpinned by recent empirical research, is that ‘state feminism’ is a phenomenon of the past. Recent feminist mobilisation and the notion of ‘market feminism’ is discussed in the end.

Key-words: feminism, women rights, womens´movements

Women’s rights movements in Norway have a long and solid tradition. A feminist public had gradually been established within the Nordic region from the 1850s, with novels demonstrating women’s hardships. Women’s situation became a symbol of the cultural-liberal critique of Nordic societies, and gender issues came front stage in lively political discussions that carved out profound changes in the discourse on sexuality (the Nordic public morals feud [sædelighetsdebatten]) with the authors like Henrik Ibsen, Bjørnstjerne  Bjørnson and Amalie Skram.  The first women’s rights organisation, The Norwegian Association for Women’s Rights, emerged in 1884 and still exists. The Norwegian National Council of Women (1904) was established as an umbrella organisation for the swarm of women’s organisations. (It was abolished in1990.[1]

Women’s early organised struggle for economic and political rights emerged in a period of unforeseen political turmoil and struggle; for parliamentary reforms; for national liberation from Swedish rule,[2] for economic reforms in a society rapidly changing from agrarian to industrial (Halsaa 2004). Women’s demand for access to higher education was of minor importance compared to the constitutional issues of the time, and was recognized without too much struggle. The number of unmarried, unemployed middleclass women had increased dramatically, and maintenance was an urgent issue. Women’s access to new trades, such as telegraph operator, teacher and nurse, was a passable solution. Unique political alliances and a liberal majority in parliament paved the way for moderate liberal bills for women’s rights.  Women had no access to the newly established political parties during that time, but they took advantage of their civil rights to speak, meet and to organise. Due to the interlocking of the state and society at large, women could channel demands through civic organisations and unions. Among the early results of women’s struggles were female suffrage (1913), closely related to the struggle for national independence; marriage reforms affirming women’s rights to divorce and to paid work (1909, 1918, 1927), and provisions for women as mothers (Melby, Ravn, and Wetterberg 2009). Women activists disagreed intensively on how to organise and on how to negotiate their demands, and disagreements were often related to social class. Gender ideology was important too; some groups justified their claims for rights mainly based on men and women as same and equal, others mainly on gender differences. The combined battle for recognition of gender specificity and difference with claims for equal treatment has continued to be a hallmark of Norwegian and Nordic feminism and women’s rights (Hernes 1987): 136.

Political mobilisation and activism is intimately connected to the actual political landscape and opportunities for protest and claims making. Consequently, this contribution sets off with a brief geo-political overview of Norwegian socio-political conditions in a gender perspective. The aim is to display some of core contextual features surrounding feminist issues and struggles. The article then discusses the relationship between women’s movements and the Norwegian state, based on recent research. The argument is that state feminism is no longer valid as a description of state-movement relationship. There is an emphasis on the intersection of gender and race/ethnicity in Norway, and the claim is that the relationship between majority Norwegian women’s activists and ethnic minority activists has been strained. The article then goes on to discuss market feminism as a potential successor of state feminism, asking: Is market feminism a relevant notion to characterise contemporary feminist movements? The final concluding section also comments briefly on the possibilities of a third wave of feminist mobilisation.

Norway in a nutshell

Norway is a long, narrow mountain land with 5,2 million inhabitants (2016), including a numerically small but politically significant, indigenous population of Sapmi people, and almost a million immigrant women and men.[3] Migration, racism and other issues related to multicultural societies has impacted feminist theorizing and activism in Norway since the 1970 when indigenous people’s struggle and immigration to Norway took off. This was expressed, for instance, in separate organising of ethnic Norwegian women, Sapmi women, and migrant women (Es 2011, Predelli & Halsaa 2012,Thun 2013;), which was related to different opportunity structures. The Norwegian borders towards Russia (Finland and Sweden) have become increasingly important due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and also the climate changes. More Russian women than men have crossed the border to Norway in recent times, and ‘marriage migrants’ have contributed to new gender and minority-majority relations, such as media discourses of Russian women as prostitutes (Flemmen 2008; Jacobsen and Skilbrei 2010).

Norway has been a Lutheran-Protestant society for centuries, with a state church until 2012 when the Constitution was changed and the Church of Norway was granted increased autonomy.  Around 75 % of the population are currently baptized members. The CoN has a relatively liberal gender and sexual policy (Mellomkirkelig råds menneskerettighetsutvalg 2013); indicated by the appointment of female priests since 1961, the first female bishop in 1993. In 2016, the Church of Norway accepted the introduction of same-sex marriage liturgy, again after a lot of mobilisation and struggle. Religious women from various faith groups take part in women’s rights activism within their own faith groups, in social media and sometimes also in feminist organisations (Predelli & Halsaa, 2012). The struggle for Muslim women’s rights is often stigmatised in media, irrespective of various traditions of Islamic feminism and gender equality (Nyhagen and Halsaa 2016; Es 2017,forthcoming).

Norway has a solid tradition of Nordic cooperation with Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, as well as the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland. The Nordic Council (1952) introduced a joint labour market in 1952, and the freedom to travel within the region without a passport (1954). Women’s movements in the Nordic countries cooperated long before these reforms, as already mentioned. Actually, they have had close ties since the beginning of organised feminism (Linder 2001; Halsaa 2004). Norwegian organisations, and the state, often refer to Nordic equality practices and ideals, thereby establishing symbolic boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them (Bygnes 2012;Thun 2012). The notion of gender equality is applied as a boundary and sometimes also as a gift to the world, as illustrated in this citation from the report ‘Women’s Europe’ by the Norwegian pro EU organisation:

“The Nordic equality model grew slowly but surely and the Nordic countries became a lighthouse in the equality work. Norway was seen as a ‘Mecca’ for women due to the 1986 ‘women’s government” (Bygnes 2012)

Despite cultural, economic and political similarities and cooperative traditions, there are important differences between the Nordic countries: Norway, Denmark and Iceland are members of NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), whereas Finland and Sweden are neutral states. Issues related to peace and war mobilised women’s activism, and Norwegian branch of ‘Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’ (WILPF) was established in 1915. They mobilised in thousands in the Nordic ‘women’s peace movement’ against NATOs placement of atomic Pershing rockets in the 1980s, and to-day, women are protesting regularly in organisations such as ‘Grandmothers for Peace’ against Norway’s contribution to NATO’s warfare outside of Europe, and against military pollution.

"Norway and Iceland are not members of the European Union (EU), unlike the Swedish, Danish and Finnish people. The Norwegian population has rejected EU membership twice, after heated debates (with 53,5 % ‘no’ votes in the 1972 referendum; and 52,2 % in the 1994 referendum). Women tend to be more negative to EU membership than men, and they have mobilised in unexpected numbers on the ‘No’ side. The still existing ‘No to EU’ (with 24 000 members) has a ‘Woman’s Committee, which frames the European Union as bad for gender equality’ and ‘a place where economic profit is more important than people’s equality and well-being' " (Bygnes 2012:12).

The definite victories of ‘no’ side in the 1972 referendum representeds an immense mobilising event. As such, the experience boosted the self-confidence of the broad ‘no’ movement, a conglomerate of liberals, social-democrats, socialist and feminists. The victory reinforced a strong belief among radical and socialist feminists that change was possible, and contributed to formidable feminist mobilisation during the 1970s. ‘The New feminists’ [Nyfeministene] (1970); the ‘Women’s Front’ [Kvinnefronten](1972), ‘Women’s United Action for Abortion on demand’ (1974);  ‘Bread and Roses (1975); the Lesbian Movement (1975), ‘The Women’s United Campaign against Pornography’ (1977), Helpline for raped and battered women (1977), Camilla, the first shelter for battered women (1978), and Foreign Women’s Group (1979, since 1989 the MiRA Resource Centre for Black, Immigrant and Refugee Women) are examples of mobilisation structures during the 1970s. The 1980s was the peak of the women’s peace movement, and also saw the organisation of Sami women when Sáráhkka – Sami Women’s Organisation (1988) was established. ‘Feminist Group Ottar’ emerged in 1991 after internal conflicts in the Women’s front; ‘Women crosswise’ [Kvinner på tvers] started in 1994 as a cooperative scheme between women in trade unions and others, with annual conferences about women and employment issues. Minority women organised locally and nationally during the 1990s, (Predelli & Halsaa 2012:30-41). From the turn of the century, feminist repertoirs of action have been broadened via cyberfeminism (internet activism), new feminist journals, and the annual Ladyfest around March 8th.

Historically, Norway has been a poor, backward country in comparison to Denmark and Sweden. Due to the finding of oil in the North Sea in 1969, and the successful extraction of the completely unforeseen and vast oil fortunes, Norway rapidly and profoundly changed, and has become one of the most affluent states in the world. Being a Nordic social democratic society, oil taxes were imposed in Norway, and the new wealth was redistributed according to social democratic standards of solidarity and relative equality. This partly explains why Norway, and the Nordic countries, is often ranked at the top in various global equality indexes, such as the UN 2015 index on health outcomes and perceptions of well-being (UNDP 2015). Women’s and gender equality institutions, including women’s studies and gender research, were established during the 1970’s and -80s, and women-friendly reforms were carried through.

 Women’s economic independence and inclusion in politics have been recognized, and have also been part of a wider egalitarian social agenda. Abortion on demand (1978), comprehensive work-family policies with - fully paid and shared - parental leave combined with public childcare, are significant measures supporting women’s employment. The discourse of gender equality as something ‘Nordic’ is important, as this citation from The Nordic Council of Ministers indicate:  ‘The Nordic Council of Ministers has during its 30 years of activity for gender equality worked to develop Nordic societies towards increased gender equality. This active engagement is characteristic of the Nordic democracies’ (Nordic Council of Ministers 2010:4). Gender relations have changed dramatically:

"In the Nordic countries, even if there are still important differences across sectors, women are by now fully integrated in all the main walks of public decision making, even if not to an equal extent. The improvement of their position over the last two decades has been so dramatic that it has changed the whole face of politics. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the increased proportion of women in political life is the most important single change in Scandinavian social life in the post-war area.’ (Karvonen and Selle 1995: 21). Despite women’s access to previously closed institutions, and men’s increased participation in care and housework, there are still challenges to gender equality and enduring gender hierarchies "NOU 2012:15 ; NOU 2011:18).

Norway has an extended coast and is among the largest fishing nations in the world. With globalisation, the introduction of neoliberal capitalism in the Norwegian fishing industry and stock collapse from the 1980s, local communities were hit hard. Many coastal and fisheries women mobilised to demand both compensation and a sustainable fisheries policy. They established the ‘Coastal Women’s Action Group’ [Kystkvinneaksjonen], an example of how women’s organising is related to economy and the labour market. Women are still earning less than men, and are more often in part-time employment, which is why slogans such as ‘A living wage’ and  ‘6 hours working day’ are still among the top issues of organised feminists and women’s rights protagonists.  Despite a number of public reports, commissions, pilot projects, and gender quotas in boardrooms (Teigen 2012), gender equality is neither achieved in relation to economic issues, nor in areas such as politics, health, care, technology or education. Women’s movements are not redundant, although their opportunities for mobilisation are fluctuating.

Farewell to state feminism

The notion of ‘state feminism’, one of the main Nordic contributions to feminist theorizing, was elaborated by Helga Hernes (Hernes 1987, 1988). It refers to the combination of 'women's agitation' or 'feminization from below', and official response in the form of 'state feminism' from above. The notion of state feminism has been widely applied and debated in gender studies (Threlfall 1998; Holst 2005; Mazur and McBride 2007; Outshoorn and Kantola 2007; McBride and Mazur 2010; Borchorst and Siim 2011).

The numerous gender equality reforms that were carried through in Norway during the 1970s and 80’s, the height of second-wave feminism, is an expression of state feminism: pressure from women from below and positive response from the state. The new oil industry brought about a favorable economic situation with increasing demand for labour. The women friendly marriage reforms of the 1920’s are early examples of state feminism, according to Melby, Ravn and Wetterberg; they were ‘political response to important challenges for society’ (Melby et.a. 2009: 5). Today, however, the question is if state feminism has been abandoned. Recent research indicate that Norwegian women’s movements are uncertain of the outcome of their encounters with the government when they make claims (Skjeie and Teigen 2007b; Skjeie 2013; Halsaa 2013). What has happened?

Formal and stable aspects of a political system impact on opportunities for collective mobilisation and claims making. The presence of funding schemes for voluntary organisations; (in)formal meeting places for deliberations with public authorities; and access to public hearing processes are examples of opportunity structures. In addition to the institutional structures, the discursive opportunity structure plays a major role (Koopmans 2004; Nyhagen Predelli and Halsaa 2012): How does the state view and appraise the various feminist and women’s rights actors and organisations, how are their claims and initiatives received? Are the activists seen as reasonable, realistic and legitimate – or not? In my empirical research, the starting point has been that organised feminism - feminist and women’s rights organisations - are the backbone of continuous feminist activism. This is not to downplay the role of feminist activism in social media and in various cultural and aesthetic activities, but that is another story.

 Consequently, I have explored the institutional and discursive opportunity structure of Norwegian gender equality policy and voluntary sector policy during the last four decades (Halsaa 2013). Based on a selection of relevant government reports, White and Green Papers as well as the Norwegian reports to the UN CEDAW committee (ibid. 2013), I have examined three aspects of state policy vis a vis feminist and women’s rights organisations:

a) the verbal recognition of women’s and feminist organisations – to what extent they were discussed in the selected policy documents;

b) the extent of economic support to women’s organisations, in relation to the support of other kinds of organisations, and

c) to what extent there are formal sites for joint deliberation – if women’s organisations were invited to committees, hearings and dialogue.

The conclusion of this research was that the political context for women’s mobilising has changed significantly; with a deterioration of the institutional and discursive opportunity structure:

Recognition of women’s movements

The recognition of feminist and women’s rights organisations is impaired if we look at the public volunteer policy [frivillighetspolitikk] from the 1980s onwards: voluntary organisations get less attention and less explicit recognition. This is clearly observed when the visibility and recognition of women’s organisations are compared to ethnic ‘minority’ organisations (Halsaa 2013: 66).

Likewise, the finding is that the opportunities are deteriorating in the field of gender equality policy: From the outset of this new policy area in the 1970 until the 1990s, the scope of action for feminist and women’s membership organisations improved. In the draft of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Gender Equality in 1980, midway in the UN’s International Year for Women, Equality, Development and Peace these organisations were explicitly recognized as crucial pushers and democratic mobilising structures for women’s rights and gender equality. One example of this is the verbal support proclaimed by the Labour Party politician Sissel Rønbeck, Secretary of State for the Ministry of Government Administration and Consumer Affairs which was responsible for gender equality policies:

"Yes, I will say it this strongly: I still perceive demands and persistence from active women’s organisations as a decisive precondition for continued progress in the efforts for gender equality" ’(Likestillingsrådet 1980, my translation,).

Women’s organisations were given credit for their contribution to the implementation of local and national aims and goals of the UN’s International Women’s Year in 1975, and during the succeeding UN’s Decade for Women, Equality, Development and Peace (1975-1985). Importantly, the Norwegian femocrats were encouraged by the UN Programme of Action for the Second Half of the United Nations Decade for Women which enhanced the recognition of women’s organisations (see paragraph 55, 57 and 100)(United Nations 1980). Regular and formal meetings between women’s NGOs and Norwegian government authorities were established, with the Equal Status Council as the pivot governmental institution.

Since the 1980’s, however, the perception of these organisations as important agents of basic women’s interests is diluted. The institutionalised deliberation has disappeared or become much weaker. When thel Equal Status Council was reformed in 1997, however, and a Center for (Gender) Equality was established, women’s organisations lost access. A major policy reform in 2006 further reduced their access: the new policy of ‘inclusion’ and ‘diversity’ was introduced, and the established Gender Equality Ombud was merged with the Centre against Ethnic Discrimination – (see Predelli & Halsaa 2012: 199-201) Women’s organisations disagreed about this change among themselves, often along racial/ethnic line, some of them arguing that women’s activists access was weakened. Later, the Commission on Equality (2010 – 2012) clearly recognised the importance of women’s organisations, and also asked for meeting points:

In the Commission’s opinion, making conditions suitable for relevant organisations to have a public voice in the debate on equality is an important democratic consideration. The organisations are both driving forces behind and a corrective to the public authorities’ efforts to promote equal-ity. The state grants to voluntary organisations working to achieve gender equality are small.

The National Commission on Gender Equality concluded that there are no permanent structures for contact between the authorities and NGO’s within the field of gender equality, and proposed establishing a contact committee between the national authorities and organisations in the field of gender equality (NOU 2011:18):116. Predelli and Halsaa (2012) concluded this way: ‘Norwegian state feminism has been thoroughly reformed since the 1990s, and women’s movement’ institutional and discursive opportunities have worsened rather than improved, through the loss of the Gender Equality centre and a general lack of political attention” (Nyhagen Predelli and Halsaa 2012: 215). Predelli found that ethnic minority women’s organisations were far from included as equal partners in dialogue and cooperation with the government (Predelli 2003). In line with Skjeie and Teigen (2007a),

Predelli and Halsaa also pointed to a divided governmental structure in the field of gender violence: A split between policies to combat ‘crisis-crisis’ or ‘minority violence’ - such as forced marriage and female genital mutilation - and ‘ordinary’ partner violence – such as wife-battering) – was institutionalised during the 2000s (Bredal 2011). Violence has been culturalised and racialized, which is a barrier to more inclusive approaches to gender equality. This reflects and reinforces a situation with limited space for minority women’s issues compared to majority women (Predelli & Halsaa 2012: 216), (Thun 2013; Bredal 2013)

Economic support

Also, the financial support is relatively less than it has been, despite numerous claims from women’s movements for better funding. Historically, the second UN International World Conference on Women in Copenhagen (1980) was a turning point for the financial support of women’s organisations in Norway. Paragraph 103 of the UN Programme of Action goes like this:

With regard to the follow-up of the World Conferences of the United Nations Decade for Women, , point a) and e) order Governments

‘(a) Consider the role and resources of non-governmental groups in the implementation of international, regional and national plans for the improvement of the situation of women; p. 25

...

(e)  Give financial resources to non-governmental groups so that these groups can make a contribution towards the implementation of the Programme of Action’ (United Nations 1980) p: 26

These recommendations were implemented in the Norwegian Plan of Action of Gender Equality; Paragraph 2.4 in the plan outlined the role of women’s organisations, and embraced a scheme for financial support  (St.prp. nr. 122 (1980-81). National women’s rights organisations could apply for general operation support. In addition, there was earmarked support for specific projects.

In a thorough investigation of funding schemes for Norwegian majority and minority women’s organisations, Cecile Thun reviewed government White Papers and guidelines for funding, and interviewed women activists of their lived experiences of funding (Thun 2014)., Thun concluded that the financial support schemes are organized into separate policy fields – gender equality and ethnic integration. Majority and minority women’s organizations have the same possibilities in principle, but in practice, the conditions differ: Funding from the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Bufdir) presupposes a member-based structure (vs. a foundation, an enterprise etc.), national scope, and at least fifty members. The aim of this scheme is to ‘encourage interest-based organizations and support their critical role.’(ibid.7).

There are no ethnic minority women’s organisation of similar scope and size, however, and a strict comparison of the funding of majority and minority women’s organisations is impossible. Still, local member-based ethnic minority women’s organisation may apply for funding from the Directorate for Integration and Diversity (IMDI). The aim of this scheme is to encourage social networking for immigrants and to promote common interests towards local authorities. In Oslo, general operating grants requires a minimum of 100 members, which is above the size of minority women’s organisations. Minority women’s organisations instead have to rely on project funding, which is short-termed, low and competitive (ibid.: 12). Thun notices that majority women’s organisations are funded according to the citizenship model of public financing, whereas minority women’s organisations are financed according to the welfare state financing model based on competitive calls for specific projects.

Thun argues that available funding schemes do ‘not adequately stimulate women’s collective citizenship and critical advocacy role in line with the description of a state feminism as a model for a political participatory process’ (ibid. : 18).  Poor funding may be a signal of weakened legitimacy, which is characteristic of the national majority women’s organizations: ‘Increased professionalization and demand for expertise have contributed to a fragile advocacy role for the membership-based organisations’( ibid. : 18 The financial scheme for minority women’s organizations ‘counteracts critical advocacy’ according to Thun. These organisations ‘are encouraged to deliver services rather than to act as collective political actors’ (ibid.: 18). The funding conditions are defined by the state’s needs and interests, which includes an emphasis on ‘crisis gender equality’. According to Thun, this implies restricted possibilities for minority women to formulate their own agenda, and this ‘may lead to a ‘depoliticizing of minority women’s voice’ (ibid.16)

Majority women’s organisations have made demands for improved financial support since long, but so far in vain. Their claims were backed by the the government-appointed Gender Equality Commission: ‘Increased support of voluntary organisations working to enhance gender equality is an important measure to improve the possibilities of these organisations to be able to put core gender equality issues on the agenda, and to be active pushers for public authorities’ (my translation) (Official Norwegian Report 2011: 18)

Hearing processes

The role of feminist and women’s organisations in governmental hearing processes is another indication of state feminism. The invitation structure suggests who are regarded as legitimate and reasonable participants in the formulation and implementation of public policies. Existing research claims that women’s organisations, including organisations in the ethnic minority field, are feebly represented in public boards and committees. In an investigation of the political opportunities for voicing minority women’s perspectives, Skjeie and Teigen looked at two hearing processes related to measures to combat forced marriages. They concluded that the inclusion of women’s organisations is selective when it comes to policies against forced marriage, which results partly in isolating and partly in fragmenting gender equality policies (Skjeie and Teigen 2007b:35). Minority women’s  organisations are primarily involved in the making of ‘crisis policy’, and involved in informal dialogues – but not incluluded in institutionalised cooperation. The majority women’s movement, that is organisations without specific help functions in relation to crisis policies, are not regarded as having publicly relevant points of view. Forced marriage is obviously a gender equality problem, but women’s movements are far from being reasonably represented in the related hearing processes (ibid : 35).

Predelli and Halsaa, in line with this, argue that selective inclusion produces a differentiation between majority women’s ‘ordinary’ inequality problems, and minority women’s ‘extraordinary’ inequality problems. They also found that this was a major issue among all the minority organisations they interviewed in Norway, Spain and the UK (Nyhagen Predelli and Halsaa 2012: 267). Three law processes were investigated: one concerning violence in close relations, one on protection against forced marriages, and one on changes in the Immigration Act (ibid:  203). It turned out that majority women’s organisations were invited to comment on the proposal concerning violence in close relations, but not on the one about the Immigration Act (which involved forced marriages),. They did not invite themselves to the hearing processes, and consequently, their voices were absent from these issues. On the other hand, only a few of the minority women’s organisations were invited to the hearing concerning violence in close relations. The pattern of selective inclusion is evident.

Let me also briefly mention the Norwegian hearing processes related to CEDAW - The UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. CEDAW was ratified by Norway in 1981, obliging Norway to report to the CEDAW Committee on the progress of implementing the convention. The regular hearings represent a national as well as transnational opportunity structure for women’s organisations; processes where they can voice their demands. Women’s organisations are obvious participants, welcomed by the CEDAW committees concern with the inclusion of women’s organisations. The question is, however, if and to what extent the Norwegian women’s organisations have been able and interested in utilising this quadrennial reporting opportunity or not. Based on the available seven reports between1986-2006, including comments from the CEDAW committee and questions to the Norwegian government, women’s organisations have clearly been involved since 1998. Of approximately 200 relevant women- and gender political organisations, however, only six are named in the official governmental documents as participating agents. (This includes one minority women’s organisation). Producing consultation papers is quite demanding, however, and the national reports have gradually expanded in scope and complexity. Thus, it has become increasingly more difficult for voluntary member-based organisations with poor funding to participate in the hearing processes.  They are short of necessary human and economic resources to engage sufficiently. They are left to rely on the professional organisations/foundations with employed personal to engage in consultation processes, for instance to produce ‘shadow reports’ (Halsaa and Thun 2010).

Policy shifts and changes

Existing research on the institutional and discursive opportunity structures clearly conclude that the golden years of Norwegian state feminism are over. Considerable policy changes have taken place, resulting in weaker mobilisation by women activists from below, and diluted responses from above. The changing relationship between state and civil society mirrors international trends of offloading state responsibilities on to the economic market; or/and to civil society and local communities (Banaszak 2003). Thun (2014) argues that state funding schemes for minority women’s organizations‘ steers them into an implementation role’ which is in line with New Public Management’s principles, competitive calls for specific projects; “contracting” out public schemes; accountability and measurable results. This is ‘an expression of new relations of governance, where funding is structured in a way that counteracts critical advocacy’ (ibid.: 18). A combination of several factors sums up to institutional and discursive shifts, which implies weakened feminist and women’s rights legitimacy:

There is the shift in the public gender equality discourse from the 1970s, when women’s rights and justice were core notions, to the 1990s’ when gender equality is promoted as a profitable tool and useful for society at large. There has been a change among activist from combatting the oppression of women and aiming for ‘women’s liberation’, to justify activism with the less contested official vocabulary of ‘gender equality’. Rather than positive discrimination of women, policies of gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting are coined in gender neutral ways. Men and masculinity have moved to the centre, and issues related to men and fatherhood have succeeded in attracting considerable funding. A gradual replacement of ‘gender equality’ with ‘diversity’ is taking place, and there is a shift from the original focus on the discrimination of women, via concern with gender relations, to a focus on all sorts of discrimination and an emerging recognition of gender as more than a dichotomous category (Skjeie and Teigen 2003: 206; Thun 2014;).

Simultaneously, there has been encompassing institutional shifts in the political institutional opportunity structure for women’s movements. The merging of the women’s and ethnic minorities policy machineries is already mentioned, and in addition there is an ongoing debate on whether to merge the various acts against discrimination, along the contested ‘one size fits all’ model. One integrated act was suggested by the Commission on Protection against Discrimination (NOU 2009:14), but was abandoned by the previous left coalition government in 2013. The hearing process displayed disagreements among women’s organisations, but a number of reports were negative because they found the draft to be lacking generally or with respect to women’s rights. The next(present) government, however awakened the merging of the legislation, and a new draft was sent from the Minister of State Solveig Horne from the right-wing Progress Party in 2015. The largest trade union are against, and a number of feminist and women’s organisations such as the Norwegian Women's Public Health Association (established in 1896 and at present the largest women’s organization in Norway with approximately 40 000 members). The Equality and Discrimination Ombud is also against the proposed legislation.

Towards a Neoliberal market feminism?

The end of state feminism, in the original Helga Hernes’ version discussed in the previous section, is quite thoroughly documented in feminist research. Contemporary scholars suggest that ‘market feminism’ (Kantola & Squire 2012), or related notions such as ‘business feminism’ ‘free market feminism’, ‘managerial feminism’ and ‘post-feminism’ (Prügl 2014) are more appropriate. Irrespective of concepts, they ask what the changes mean for feminist activism.

Nancy Fraser describes changes in feminist movements since the 1970s in quite negative terms, (Fraser 2009), as a neoliberal feminism that operates in a context of neoliberal capitalism – a feminism that has lost its ‘emancipatory promise’ (ibid.:100). The rise of second-wave feminism, according to Fraser, coincided with a historical shift in the character of capitalism. Feminism ‘thrived’ in the new conditions of privatization, deregulation, ‘personal responsibility’ in place of public provision within a ‘competition state’ (ibid.: 107), but the effect ‘was to resignify feminist ideals’ (ibid: 108). Fraser upholds that there is a ‘dangerous liason’ with neoliberalism (Fraser 2009:114 and 2013), and that the shift to a neoliberal capitalist global economy has gone hands in glove with feminist claims that resonates with a market agenda. Fraser writes about neoliberal feminism as ‘a strange shadowy version of itself, an uncanny double that it can neither simply embrace nor wholly disavow’ (Fraser 2009: 114).

Elisabth Prügl (2014) and Johanna Kantola & Judith Squires (2012) also discuss feminist adaptions to the context of global, neoliberal markets. Compared to Fraser’s sweeping normative-theoretical approach, their take on contemporary feminism is more empirical. They uphold that neoliberalist capitalism comes ‘in multiple forms’ (Prügl 2014:3), and that ‘there is no “pure” form of neoliberalism’(Kantola & Squires 2012: 385). Hence, they are more open to the effects of the complex and contradictory features of neoliberal capitalism: New opportunities as well as new threats are potential outcomes:

 "Market feminism, in this context, might be read as a reformulation of feminist agenda and as providing new forms of political engagement’ according to Kantola & Squires" (ibid. : 395).

"Market feminism is linked to the emergence of a new form of governance, one that off-loads state power to civil society, that draws on increasingly transnationalised network of gender experts, and that entails the professionalization and transnationalisation of movement activists,’ according to Prügl (2014: 7). Kantola and Squires (2012) note that uploading and downloading processes present women’s movements with a more fragmented and diverse set of state institutions and increase access and opportunities. Lateral loading and offloading processes, however, imply a depoliticized and remote set of state policy-making agencies – and ‘works against the inclusion of women’s interests and gender equality issues in public policy discussions, formulation and implementation"(ibid. : 386).

Neo-liberal governance and New Public Management have included markets and civil society in policy-making and implementation. This create new opportunity structures for feminist experts and activists; their expertise is demanded in evidence-based policy-making, and feminist projects may be empowered financially. But, feminist organisations also have to live up to strict accountability and budget discipline; to ‘frame their interventions in objective rather than interest-based terms’ Kantola & Squires 2012: 387), and to ‘translate their activities into financial terms’ (ibid: 386) that resonates with markets.  Femocrats now turn to the market rather than the state, and there has been a general shift in the funding of women’s organizations to private funding (ibid: 383).

The introduction of gender mainstreaming and diversity policies also ‘facilitate new forms of claim-making, however (ibid: 383)

Resurgence of Norwegian feminism during market capitalism?

How does the descriptions of market feminism and the claim of feminism as ‘a handmaiden’ of neoliberal capitalism (Fraser 2013) resonate with contemporary Norwegian feminist and women’s activism? The question of market feminism as an accurate description of contemporary Norwegian feminism is beyond the scope of this article, but I will sketch a few points of view, starting with the question of feminist mobilization. Neoliberal capitalism does not seem to impair feminist activism. In Norway, as elsewhere, there are claims of a new, a ‘third or even a fourth ‘wave’ of feminism. Irrespective of the contested notion of ‘wave’ (Laughlin et al. 2010; Dean 2009; Lønnå 2004; Dahlerup 2004; Hesford 2013), it is still applied as a metaphor (Gosse 2016; Holst 2009).

During the last few years, we have witnessed some instances of a resurgence of feminist and women’s rights activism. This has partly a response to deteriorating political opportunities: After a brief moment of optimism in the wake of the comprehensive reforms in gender equality policies suggested by the Commission on gender equality (NOU 2011:18; NOU 2012:15;15), activists were quite disappointed with the rather bleak White paper (St.meld. 44 (2012-2013) presented by the social democratic coalition government. Frustration increased, however, when the succeeding right-wing coalition government that came to power in 2013 withdrew the White paper. Several proposals by the new ‘blue-blue’ government brought about feminist mobilisation and protest: The reduction of the “father’s quota” (the paid parental leave reserved for fathers), but even more the suggested restriction of abortion rights.

The proposal was to provide an opportunity to the general practitioners to decline from referring women to a hospital for abortion – a proposal that immediately result in heated debates in the media, and massive feminis tactivism in the streets and in social media. Thousands of women and men were on the streets on the 8th of March 2014, the International Women’s Day (which has a high standing in Norwegian women’s movements). One outcome was that the governmental proposal was withdrawn, and another outcome was that a new generation of women, and pro-feminist men, had a momentous experience with the potency of politics. Political mobilization can be beneficial to women.

A less striking mark of feminist mobilisation also took place in 2014: The umbrella organization ‘Norwegian Women’s Lobby’ (http://www.kvinnelobby.no) was established. As explained previously, Norway is not a member of the European Union and has never had a National Coordination within the EU’s ‘Women’s Lobby’. Movement activists have discussed the need for an umbrella organization to coordinate claims and actions from time to time since the Norwegian National Council of Women was abolished in 1990. ‘FOKUS – Forum for Women and Development’ has not been given such a mandate, despite its coordinating role with respect to CEDAW and the UN. In 2014, however, the time was ripe to energize the use of scarce resources and joint forces. The Women’s Lobby consists of majority women’s organisations as well as minority womens’s organisations (migrant women and Sapmi women); membership based andand a mix of professional women’s organisations (http://www.kvinnelobby.no/om-oss ).

The initiative is an interesting symbol of more understanding and less friction between various groups of organized women’s movement activists. They perceived a need to coordinate women’s demands and an effort to mobilise counterforce in times of decreasing number of members of mobilisation of conservative or right-wing in the formal organizations, of ‘blue feminism’, and the impact of a conservative, even populist right-wing gender equality discourse. The profile of the Lobby underlines the extent to which feminism is a transnational and global phenomenon, and the need to join forces in order to make an impact on national and international policy-making. It is far too early, however, to make assessments of the Lobby’s potential for activism, and in what ways it deals with the claims of neo-capitalism.

New Nordic Feminism?

The Nordic Forum in Malmö, Sweden, during the summer 2014 is another example of recent feminist activism. Approximately 20 000 women, and some men, met for a week to discuss, demonstrate, make demands, invigorate and have fun.  It was an impressive event, with twice as many participants as the Nordic Forum in Oslo, 1988 – and indicates that feminisms’ talent for mobilisation is not a thing of the past. With respect to the question of market feminism and feminism as a handmaiden of neo-capitalism, a comparison of the two Nordic Form’s seems to be a promising researchapproach. This is exactly one of the tasks in the ongoing project ‘’Future of Feminism in the Nordic Region’ http://www.en.cgs.aau.dk/research/projects/future-feminisms.

We have set out to compare the organisers of the two FORUM’s the organisers of specific events and slots, the funding schemes, the content of  the particular events published in the programmes, and finally the claims presented to governments and other relevant actors at the end of the FORUMs. The comparison provides an empirical basis for exploring claims of a shift from state feminism to market feminism.

Ideally,, for this research approach there should have been a Nordic Forum during the 1970’s, at the beginning of the second-wave feminist movement in the context of ‘state-organised capitalism’ (Fraser, 2009)– with which to campare the 2014 event. However, the first Forum took place in 1988, a ‘typical’ achievement of Nordic state feminism: The initiative was a combination of top down and bottom up efforts. The actual idea came from the Nordic Council of Minister’s Gender Equality Committee, during a follow-up meeting in Iceland after the UN International Women’s conference in Nairobi 1985. Nordic Forum should in particular be for women with affiliation to women’s organisations, grassroots movements and other non-governmental association. Thus, women’s organisations and grassroots movements were given the main responsibility for planning and implementing the programme, but the Nordic Council of Ministers, provided the funding for the planning and coordination of the conference, with some additional funding from the Norwegian government, and symbolic contributions from four non-governmental sponsors (Knudsen and Moen 1989).

The Nordic Forum in 2014, however, was entirely a grassroots initiative, by the Swedish Women’s Lobby, but was actually carried out in close cooperation with Nordic governments, the Nordic Council of Ministers as well as two Swedish regions and the City of Malmö (Nordic Forum Secretariat 2014). It was geared towards the same groups as in 1988, and in addition political parties, private sector, authorities, the general public and other stakeholders in the Nordic region ‘and the rest of the World’ (ibid.). The Forum in Malmö was funded by numerous sponsors – gold, silver and bronze sponsors – but also succeeded in considerable grant from the Swedish government.

We have noticed that aspects of the initiative and organising of the Nordic Forum in 1988 and 2014 do comply with a transition from state to market feminism. Our main aim is to explore whether the 2014 Forum really is a handmaiden of neoliberal capitalism (Fraser 2013), and if not, if it signals ‘a possible reorientation of feminism (….) which could mark the beginnings of– and the prospects for reactivating feminism’s emancipatory promise’)’ (Fraser 2009: 98).  We are examining the participants and titles of the various slots on the 1988 versus 2014 programme, but the results are not ready. For the time being, the reader has to be content with the questions we have raised about changed context and changed practices of Norwegian and Nordic feminism.

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Biography:

Beatrice Halsaa, Professor, Centre for Gender Research, University of Oslo, Norway. Editor in Chief of NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research (2016-2018). Engaged in the Nordic project ‘Future of Feminism in the Nordic Region’ http://www.en.cgs.aau.dk/research/projects/future-feminisms. Latest book, Religion, Gender and Citizenship: Women of Faith, Gender Equality and Feminism (with Line Nyhagen, 2016, Palgrave Macmillan), explores views and experiences of Christian and Muslim women living in Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom related to their faith, citizenship, gender equality, women’s movements and feminism.  Beatrice’s previous book is Majority-Minority Relations in Contemporary Women’s Movements: Strategic Sisterhood (also with Line Nyhagen Predelli; Palgrave Macmillan 2012). Beatrice’s last edited book is Remaking Citizenship in Multicultural Europe: Women's Movements, Gender and Diversity (with Sasha Roseneil and Sevil Sümer; Palgrave Macmillan 2012). These books have emerged from the research project Gendered citizenship in multicultural Europe: The impact of contemporary women’s movements FEMCIT, funded by the European Commission.